constrained mechanism造句
例句與造句
- Chapters 6 constrain mechanism in multi - level fiscal system
第6章分級財政制度中的約束機制。 - In order to reduce audit risk and improve audit quality , the main measure is to set up an effective incentive and constrain mechanism
為了減少審計風(fēng)險、提高審計質(zhì)量，最主要的措施是采取有效的激勵和約束機制。 - Focus on the inherent constrain mechanism in multi - level , intergovernmental fiscal system , presents an argument that the perfectly des
指出完善的分級財政制度是一種是權(quán)力與義務(wù)對稱、激勵與約束兼容的治理結(jié)構(gòu)。 - This paper analyzes on the representations of the moral risk of the managers in stock options system , probes into the construction of corresponding strategy from aspects of the performance evaluation system , internal constrained mechanism , and external supervision mechanism , etc
分析了股票期權(quán)制中經(jīng)理人的道德風(fēng)險表現(xiàn),從業(yè)績評價體系、內(nèi)部約束機制、外部監(jiān)管機制等幾個方面探討了應(yīng)對策略的構(gòu)建。 - If we think establishing modern enterprise institution and developing the big and middle sized state - owned enterprises as the central part of our country ' s economic structure reform , the construction of motivation and constraining mechanisms of manager may be thought as the central part of forming modern enterprise institution
如果說建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度、搞好國有大中型企業(yè)是我國經(jīng)濟體制改革的中心環(huán)節(jié)，那么經(jīng)營者激勵和約束機制的購建則是建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的中心環(huán)節(jié)。 - It's difficult to find constrained mechanism in a sentence. 用constrained mechanism造句挺難的
- This part provides the basic model of principal - agency and summarize extend model of principal - agency through introducing the development of agent problem , principal - agency relationship and theory hypothesis and so on . in the chapter three , in which establishes an incentive - constrain mechanism game model . the chapter four , in which analyzes the manager action of state enterprise , rebuilds the incentive - constrain mechanism of manager of state enterprise
本文分為五部分:第一章為緒論,詳細介紹了該學(xué)位論文的目的、研究的理論意義及現(xiàn)實意義、研究的方法、研究的思路以及本文的創(chuàng)新之處;第二章為委托?代理理論的概述,該部分主要從代理問題的產(chǎn)生和發(fā)展、委托?代理關(guān)系、理論假設(shè)前提等幾個方面給出了委托-代理理論的基本框架以及應(yīng)用于現(xiàn)實中的擴展模型;第三章為建立激勵約束機制數(shù)學(xué)博弈模型;第四章為對國企經(jīng)理行為特征進行深層探析,重建國企經(jīng)理激勵監(jiān)督約束機制。 - The venture capital has some problems , such as low efficiency , little capital scale , no manager market of venture capital , lacking incentive & constrain mechanism , no smooth withdrawing channel of venture capital . in this article , information economics has been applied to the research of the game between investor and venture capitalist
如投資效率低；資金規(guī)模小，來源渠道狹窄，國有資本占主導(dǎo)地位；風(fēng)險投資經(jīng)理市場沒有建立起來，缺乏優(yōu)秀的風(fēng)險投資家；激勵、約束機制相對缺乏，風(fēng)險投資家報酬機制不合理；風(fēng)險資本退出途徑不順暢、風(fēng)險投資的配套法規(guī)、政策不健全等。 - This dissertation , firstly , takes the managerial incentive and constraining mechanisms in the listed companies as the research subject . based on defining and clarifying the connotations and extensions of the basic concepts concerned , this dissertation holds that the incentives and constraints are of dialectical unity relationship
論文首先把研究對象定位在上市公司經(jīng)營者的激勵約束機制上，在對選題研究所涉及到的一些基本概念的內(nèi)涵和外延進行界定和說明的基礎(chǔ)上，指出文章所研究的激勵約束是辯證統(tǒng)一的。 - This thesis puts forward two ways , which are enterprise self constrain , and government supervise to regulative western consultant market according to present market economy status . the probability of enterprise self constrain based on the maintenance of associate ' s benefit and full - heart service for enterprise . the guild " s perfect serf constrain mechanism assure that it self constrain
在企業(yè)(行業(yè))自西安建筑科技大學(xué)碩士論文律的作用研究方面，指出了企業(yè)(行業(yè))自律的可能性建立在維護會員利益，全心全意為企業(yè)服務(wù)的基礎(chǔ)上，提出了行業(yè)協(xié)會完善的自律機制是發(fā)揮其自律作用的保證。 - Principal - agency has become the principal problem in the research of incentive - constrain mechanism in enterprise . in state enterprise , for it has more complicate and more badly principal - agency problem that state enterprise could not provide effective incentive - constrain mechanism . the principal - agency theory could provide an appropr - - iate analytical point for the reform of state enterprise
委托-代理問題成為企業(yè)激勵約束機制設(shè)計研究的主要問題,在我國國有企業(yè)中,因其比其他企業(yè)具有更為復(fù)雜的委托-代理關(guān)系和更為嚴(yán)重的委托-代理問題,從而不能提供有效的激勵約束機制,委托-代理理論則為我國的國企改革提供了一個很好的分析視角。 - In this article , the model of enterprise technology innovation system was introduced on the basis of thinking the research of the enterprise technology innovation by scholars . in the model , there are model of motive mechanism , model of incentive mechanism , model of constraining mechanism , model of supporting mechanism and method of innovation
本文在綜合國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上，站在企業(yè)的角度，提出了企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新體系，在這個體系中，包含了企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新動力機制模型、激勵機制模型、約束機制模型、支撐機制模型、創(chuàng)新方法等幾個部分及這幾個部分的作用關(guān)系。 - How to establish an effective incentive - constrain mechanism for an agent of the enterprise ? in this article , based on ready reference and research , we provide incentive - constrain game model of agent with game theory on condition that the information is incompletion between principal and agent . in this way , the incentive - constrain mechanism for manager of state enterprise is established
如何建立有效的企業(yè)代理人激勵約束機制,本文在現(xiàn)有文獻和已有研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,采用博弈論的方法來分析代理人的行為,建立了不完全信息下代理人行為激勵約束博弈模型,建立中國國企經(jīng)理激勵約束機制。